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Abstract. In the paper, we study a model of influence in a social network. It is assumed that
each player has an inclination to say YES or NO which, due to influence of other players, may
be different from the decision of the player. The point of departure here is the concept of the
Hoede-Bakker index - the notion which computes the overall decisional ‘power’ of a player in a
social network. The main drawback of the Hoede-Bakker index is that it hides the actual role
of the influence function, analyzing only the final decision in terms of success and failure. In this
paper, we separate the influence part from the group decision part, and focus on the description and
analysis of the influence part. We propose among other descriptive tools a definition of a (weighted)
influence index of a coalition upon an individual. Moreover, we consider different influence functions
representative of commonly encountered situations. Finally, we propose a suitable definition of a
modified decisional power.
JEL Classification: C7, D7
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1 Introduction
A considerable part of the literature in social choice and voting games concerns power
indices and related concepts. There is a vast literature which presents a theoretical anal-
ysis of power indices, their axiomatization as well as their applications; see e.g., Penrose
(1946), Banzhaf (1965), Rae (1969), Shapley and Shubik (1954), Dubey and Shapley
(1979), Coleman (1971, 1986), Deegan and Packel (1978), Holler and Packel (1983), John-
ston (1978), van den Brink and van der Laan (1998), van der Laan and van den Brink
(1998, 2002), Felsenthal et al. (1998); see e.g., Felsenthal and Machover (1998) for an
overview.
In the literature, also some measures of ‘power’ or ‘control’ in networks have been
proposed. For a network, which consists of a set of positions and a set of bilateral links
between the positions, one may define a cooperative transferable utility game which
measures the power of coalitions of positions and, for instance, one may apply the Shapley
value (Shapley, 1953) to this network power game; see e.g., van den Brink and Gilles
(2000), van den Brink and Borm (2002), van den Brink et al. (2007).
One may also find in the literature various generalizations and extensions of the
concept of power index. We may cite among them Owen (1977, 1981), Felsenthal and
Machover (2002), and Feix et al. (2007), who consider a priori unions, blocs and alliances.
In particular, the concept of alliance considers an internal mechanism among players
of an alliance, who have a priori different opinions, but agree on a common decision.
The question is then to study the power of the alliance compared to the power of the
individuals in the alliance. In Hu and Shapley (2003), where a complex organization is
presented with different kinds of players (boss, free agent, cog, yesman, etc.), the authors
prefer to speak of an authority distribution among players rather than of a power index.
Taking a more general point of view, this kind of situations may be viewed as in-
stances of influence among players, in the sense that their final decision may differ from
their original inclination. Specifically, it is considered that each player has an inclina-
tion (original decision) to say YES or NO in some voting situation. For each possible
configuration i of individual inclinations, it is supposed that after mutual influence the
actual decision Bi of all players is made, where B denotes the influence function. Then,
a group decision gd(Bi) is made. This is in fact the framework considered originally in
Hoede and Bakker (1982), who proposed the concept of decisional power of a player (the
Hoede-Bakker index), and which was later generalized and modified in Rusinowska and
De Swart (2006).
Despite the interest of the idea of decisional power of a player in a situation where
influence exists, the Hoede-Bakker index fails to give a full description of the situation,
in the sense that it hides the actual role of the influence function B, analyzing only the
final decision in terms of success and failure w.r.t. the original inclination. To the best of
our knowledge, there is no specific work which focuses on the influence phenomenon and
tries to describe and analyze it. This is precisely what we aim for in this paper. More
precisely, our aims are:
– to introduce indices measuring the influence among players in networks (Section 3);
– to provide tools describing and analyzing the influence function B (Section 4);
– to study properties of some specific influence functions (Section 5).
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In other words, we separate in our description the influence part and the group decision
part. Since to our knowledge the former has not been studied per se, we focus on this part
of the description, which constitutes the most original part of the paper and is presented
in Sections 3, 4, and 5. Essentially, we propose the following tools:
– An index of influence of a coalition S upon a player i outside S. The general idea
is to compute a weighted number of times the coalition S makes player i change his
decision. Two particular ways of weighting lead to a possibility influence index which
takes into account any possibility of influence, and to a certainty influence index
which expresses certainty of influence. We also distinguish between a direct influence
(i follows S), and opposite influence (by a kind of reactive behavior, i decides the
opposite of S).
– The concept of follower, where by a follower of a given coalition of players we mean
the voter who always decides according to the inclination of the coalition in question.
Analogously, we propose the concept of anti-follower for opposite influence.
– The concept of purely influential function of one coalition upon another coalition.
Function B is a purely influential function of coalition S upon coalition T if, in case
all players of S have the same inclination, all members of T decide according to the
inclination of S, and all players outside T follow their own inclination. A purely in-
fluential function is called canonical if additionally, in case the players of S do not
have the same inclination, all players decide according to their own inclinations. Be-
sides, we propose several typical examples of influence functions, depicting commonly
encountered situations, such as a majority function, a ‘guru’ function, the identity
function, and some others.
– The concept of kernel of an influence function, that is, the set of its ‘true’ (minimal)
influential coalitions.
The structure of the paper is the following. In Section 2, we recall the original and the
generalized Hoede-Bakker indices. In Section 3, the various influence indices are defined.
The concepts of followers and purely influential functions are analyzed in Section 4.
Different influence functions and their properties are studied in Section 5. The notions
of success, decisiveness, and the modified decisional power are considered in Section 6.
Conclusions, including some ideas for future research, are presented in Section 7. All
concepts introduced in the paper are illustrated with a three-player family example.
2 The Hoede-Bakker index
First we recapitulate the original Hoede-Bakker index as introduced in Hoede and Bakker
(1982), and its generalization given in Rusinowska and De Swart (2006). The general
framework is the following. We consider a social network with the set of all players
(agents, actors, voters) denoted by N := {1, ..., n}. The players have to make a certain
acceptance-rejection decision. Each player has an inclination either to say YES (denoted
by +1) or NO (denoted by −1). An inclination vector, denoted by i, is an n-vector
consisting of ones and minus ones. Let I := {−1,+1}n be the set of all inclination
vectors. For convenience, (1, 1, . . . , 1) ∈ I is denoted by 1N , similarly for −1N , and also
for mixed cases like (−1N\S, 1S).
It is assumed that players may influence each others, and due to the influences in
the network, the final decision of a player may be different from his original inclination.
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In other words, each inclination vector i ∈ I is transformed into a decision vector Bi,
where B : I → I, i 7→ Bi is the influence function. The coordinates of Bi are denoted
by (Bi)k, k ∈ N . The set of all influence functions will be denoted by B. The decision
vector Bi is an n-vector consisting of ones and minus ones and indicating the decisions
made by all players. Let B(I) be the set of all decision vectors under B. Furthermore, the
group decision function gd : B(I) → {+1,−1} is introduced, having the value +1 if the
group decision is YES, and the value −1 if the group decision is NO. The set of all group
decision functions will be denoted by G. The following definition has been introduced in
Hoede and Bakker (1982):
Definition 1 Given B ∈ B and gd ∈ G, the decisional power (the Hoede-Bakker index)
of a player k ∈ N is given by
HBk(B, gd) :=
1
2n−1
∑
{i|ik=+1}
gd(Bi).
In Rusinowska and De Swart (2006), a certain generalization of the Hoede-Bakker index
has been proposed:
Definition 2 Given B ∈ B and gd ∈ G, the generalized Hoede-Bakker index of a player
k ∈ N is given by
GHBk(B, gd) :=
1
2n
 ∑
{i|ik=+1}
gd(Bi)−
∑
{i|ik=−1}
gd(Bi)
 . (1)
Although the (generalized) Hoede-Bakker index is defined in the framework of influ-
ence, this is not a measure of influence among players. First of all, we notice that neither
in the original definition of the Hoede-Bakker index nor in its generalization mentioned
above, the functions B and gd are considered separately. When calculating the (original
or generalized) Hoede-Bakker index, only the relation between an inclination vector i
and the group decision gd(Bi) is taken into account. Although incorporating an influence
aspect into the framework could be seen as an attractive feature of the Hoede-Bakker
index, in fact the actual role of the influence function B is hidden. In order to see this
better, let us consider the following example.
Example 1 All the concepts introduced in the paper will be illustrated in a leading
example, which will be referred to as the Family Example. We analyze a three-actor
family network with a child (player 1), a mother (player 2) and a father (player 3). The
family has to decide for a long Sunday bicycle trip. The child is influenced by his parents
in the sense that if the parents have the same inclinations, the child will follow them,
but if their inclinations differ from each other, the child will decide according to his own
inclination. It is a ‘fair’ family decision-making, and the majority vote is assumed: the
family decides for the trip if at least two family members say YES. Table 1 presents the
group decision for the example.
By virtue of (1), we get the following:
GHB1(B, gd) = GHB2(B, gd) = GHB3(B, gd) =
1
2
.
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Table 1. The group decision
i ∈ I (1, 1, 1) (1, 1,−1) (1,−1, 1) (−1, 1, 1) (1,−1,−1) (−1, 1,−1) (−1,−1, 1) (−1,−1,−1)
B(i) (1, 1, 1) (1, 1,−1) (1,−1, 1) (1, 1, 1) (−1,−1,−1) (−1, 1,−1) (−1,−1, 1) (−1,−1,−1)
gd(Bi) 1 1 1 1 −1 −1 −1 −1
Although no influence of the child on the parents is assumed here, the index of player 1
is equal to the indices of the remaining (influencing) players. Consequently, one can see
a need to introduce an index which indeed measures an influence among players.
3 The influence indices
When analyzing the ‘influence part’ of the model, a question appears how to measure a
degree of influence of a player (or a coalition) on the other voter(s). The answer is not
that straightforward if we can just observe inclinations and final decisions of the players
in a multi-player social network. Suppose the final decision of player A is different from
his inclination, but this decision coincides with the inclinations of two other players in
the network, say, agents B and C. Is voter A’s decision different from his inclination
because of the unique influence of player B, or the unique influence of player C, or maybe
A has decided differently from his inclination only because he has faced an influence of
the strong two-party coalition? These are the questions that not always can be answered
univocally if apart from knowing the function B, we are not able to observe a ‘real act
of influencing among players’. Consequently, we introduce a family of influence indices.
Generally speaking, we say that a player is influenced by a coalition (of players with
the same inclination) if the decision of the player is different from his (original) inclination.
Such a general definition of influence can be motivated as follows. Since the player has
‘changed his mind’ and decided differently from his preliminary thoughts, there had to be
a kind of influence from ‘outside’ which has caused this change. We assume this ‘outside’
influence to come from other agents in the network who are unanimous in their opinions
(inclinations). We distinguish between a direct influence and an opposite influence. In the
first case, the player’s inclination is different from the inclination of that coalition, but
the player’s decision is the same as the inclination of the coalition. In the latter case,
the player’s inclination coincides with the inclination of the coalition, but by a kind of
reactive behavior, his decision is different from the inclination of the coalition. The direct
influence of a coalition is therefore related to the ability to make the players, who are
inclined differently from the coalition, decide according to the inclination of that coalition.
The concept of the opposite influence captures, in particular, the case of an ‘independent
child’: although his inclination coincides with the parents’ inclination, in order to show
his ‘independence’, he decides differently from his parents’ inclination, and consequently,
differently from his own inclination.
Of course, the direct influence and the opposite influence are related to each other,
in the sense that usually there are both the direct influence and the opposite influence,
coming from different coalitions. Suppose there is a coalition with the positive inclination,
another coalition with the negative inclination, and a player who has the inclination to
say NO, but finally he says YES. In such a situation, we record both the direct influence
of the first coalition, and the opposite influence of the latter coalition on the given player,
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but we cannot know the actual reason for which the player has decided differently from
his inclination. Since these two kinds of influence are related to each other, and since in
principle the direct influence seems to be more ‘natural’ than the opposite influence, in
some sections we present results which concern the direct influence only.
Before formalizing the influence concepts, we introduce several notations for conve-
nience. First of all, cardinality of sets S, T, . . . will be denoted by the corresponding lower
case s, t, . . .. We omit braces for sets, e.g., {k,m}, N \ {j}, S ∪ {j} will be written km,
N \ j, S ∪ j, etc. We also introduce for any S ⊆ N , |S| ≥ 2, the set IS of all inclination
vectors under which all members of S have the same inclination
IS := {i ∈ I | ∀k, j ∈ S [ik = ij]},
and Ik := I, for any k ∈ N . We denote by iS the value ik for some k ∈ S, i ∈ IS. Let for
each S ⊆ N and j ∈ N
IS→j := {i ∈ IS | ij = −iS}
I∗S→j(B) := {i ∈ IS→j | (Bi)j = iS}.
IS→j and I∗S→j(B) denote the set of all inclination vectors of potential direct influence of
S on j, and the set of all inclination vectors of direct influence of S on j under given
B ∈ B, respectively. Similarly, we introduce the set of all inclination vectors of potential
opposite influence and the set of all inclination vectors of opposite influence of a coalition
on a player. Let for each S ⊆ N and j ∈ N
IopS→j := {i ∈ IS | ij = iS}
I∗opS→j(B) := {i ∈ IopS→j | (Bi)j = −iS}.
Some elementary properties of these notions are given below.
Proposition 1 Let ∅ 6= S, S ′ ⊆ N , with S ⊆ S ′, and B ∈ B. The following holds.
(i) IS→j = I∗S→j(B) = ∅ for each j ∈ S.
(ii) IopS→j = IS, for each j ∈ S.
(iii) |IS→j| = |IopS→j| = 2n−s, for each j ∈ N \ S.
(iv) IS→j ∪ IopS→j = IS, for each j ∈ N .
(v) IS ⊇ IS′, IS→j ⊇ IS′→j, IopS→j ⊇ IopS′→j, for each j ∈ N .
(vi) I∗S→j(B) ⊇ I∗S′→j(B), I∗opS→j(B) ⊇ I∗opS′→j(B), for each j ∈ N .
3.1 The ‘basic’ influence indices
Below, we formalize the influence concepts. First, we introduce the possibility influence
indices.
Definition 3 Given B ∈ B, for each S ⊆ N and j ∈ N \S, the possibility direct influence
index of coalition S on player j is defined as
d(B, S → j) := |I
∗
S→j(B)|
|IS→j|
and the possibility opposite influence index of coalition S on player j is defined as
d
op
(B, S → j) := |I
∗op
S→j(B)|
|IopS→j|
.
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d(B, S → j) ∈ [0, 1] (respectively dop(B, S → j) ∈ [0, 1]) measures a degree of a direct
(respectively opposite) influence coalition S has on player j, taking into account any
possibility of influence. We check therefore how many inclination vectors of potential
direct (respectively opposite) influence of coalition S on player j are indeed the vectors of
direct (respectively opposite) influence of S on j. We do not verify here the inclinations
of the players outside S ∪ j. In particular, a situation in which all players in N \ (S ∪ j)
have the inclination different from the inclination of S, and each situation in which there
are players in N \ (S ∪ j) with the same inclination as the inclination of S, are treated
equally.
Switching to another extreme way of calculating influence degree gives us the defini-
tions of the certainty influence indices. Here, we take into account only those situations
in which all players outside S ∪ j have the inclination different from the inclination of S.
Definition 4 Given B ∈ B, for each S ⊆ N and j ∈ N \S, the certainty direct influence
index of coalition S on player j is given by
d(B, S → j) := |{i ∈ I
∗
S→j(B) | ∀p /∈ S [ip = −iS]}|
2
and the certainty opposite influence index of coalition S on player j is given by
dop(B, S → j) := |{i ∈ I
∗op
S→j(B) | ∀p /∈ S ∪ j [ip = −iS]}|
2
.
d(B, S → j) ∈ {0, 1
2
, 1} (respectively dop(B, S → j) ∈ {0, 1
2
, 1}) measures a degree of
a certain (since only S could have influenced j) direct (respectively opposite) influence
coalition S has on player j. Note that for each S ⊆ N and j ∈ N \ S
dop(B, S → j) = d(B,N \ (S ∪ j)→ j).
3.2 The weighted influence indices
Finally, we propose more general definitions of the influence indices, which we call the
weighted influence indices. These indices take into account the number of agents with
the same inclination as the inclination of an influencing coalition. The main idea of the
weighted index is therefore to capture different alternatives for ‘sharing the influence
ability’ between all agents with the same inclination as the inclination of the coalition
in question. The weighted indices capture, in particular, the two basic cases presented in
Section 3.1.
Let for each S ⊆ N , j /∈ S and i ∈ IS
n∗(S, j, i) := |{m ∈ N \ j | im = iS}| ≥ s.
n∗(S, j, i) is the number of players with the same inclination as players of S under i ∈ IS
(including the players from S, but excluding player j).
For each S ⊆ N , j ∈ N \S and i ∈ IS, we introduce a weight αS→ji ∈ [0, 1] of influence
of coalition S on j ∈ N \ S under the inclination vector i ∈ IS. We assume that for each
S ⊆ N and j ∈ N \S, there exists i ∈ IS→j such that αS→ji > 0, and there exists i ∈ IopS→j
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such that αS→ji > 0. Moreover, we impose the symmetry assumption that α
S→j
i depends
solely on n∗(S, j, i). Hence, one may note that for each ∅ 6= S ⊆ N and j ∈ N \ S∑
i∈I+S→j
αS→ji =
∑
i∈I−S→j
αS→ji , (2)
with
I+S→j := {i ∈ IS→j | iS = +1}, I−S→j := {i ∈ IS→j | iS = −1}. (3)
Remark also that ∑
i∈IS→j
αS→ji =
∑
i∈IopS→j
αS→ji .
Definition 5 Given B ∈ B, for each S ⊆ N , j ∈ N \ S, the weighted direct influence
index of coalition S on player j is defined as
dα(B, S → j) :=
∑
i∈I∗S→j(B) α
S→j
i∑
i∈IS→j α
S→j
i
∈ [0, 1]
and the weighted opposite influence index of coalition S on player j is defined as
dopα (B, S → j) :=
∑
i∈I∗opS→j(B) α
S→j
i∑
i∈IopS→j α
S→j
i
∈ [0, 1].
The possibility and certainty influence indices are recovered as follows. For each S ⊆ N ,
j ∈ N \ S and B ∈ B
d(B, S → j) = dα(B, S → j), dop(B, S → j) = dopα (B, S → j)
where αS→ji = 1 for each i ∈ IS
d(B, S → j) = dα(B, S → j), dop(B, S → j) = dopα (B, S → j)
where for each i ∈ IS
αS→ji =
{
1, if ∀p /∈ S ∪ j, ip = −iS
0, otherwise.
Hence, both in the possibility and certainty influence indices, the weight of influence
is equal to 1. The essential difference is that when calculating the possibility influence
index, all possible cases of influence are treated equally, while for the certainty influence
indices only the cases in which all players outside S ∪ j are inclined differently from S
are considered.
Apart from the possibility and certainty influence indices, we specify other ones which
we denote by d∗ and d∗op, and refer to as the equidistributed direct influence index and
the equidistributed opposite influence index, respectively. Given B ∈ B, for each S ⊆ N ,
j ∈ N \ S
d∗(B, S → j) = dα∗(B, S → j), d∗op(B, S → j) = dopα∗(B, S → j)
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where α∗S→ji =
1
2n∗(S,j,i) − 1 for each i ∈ IS.
The definition of the equidistributed influence index can be explained as follows: for each
S ⊆ N , j ∈ N \ S and i ∈ IS, we count the number of all p-player coalitions of the set
{m ∈ N \ j | im = iS}, where p = 1, ..., n∗(S, j, i), which gives
n∗(S,j,i)∑
p=1
(
n∗(S, j, i)
p
)
= 2n
∗(S,j,i) − 1.
Hence, given S and j, two inclination vectors with equal numbers of agents having the
same inclination as the inclination of S are treated equally, and the maximal weight 1 is
divided by the number of possible coalitions that could be ‘responsible’ for the influence.
Finally, remark that the weighted influence index has no monotonicity property w.r.t.
S, i.e., it is not true in general that if S ⊆ S ′, then dα(B, S → j) ≤ dα(B, S ′ → j) or the
converse. This is because both IS→j and I∗S→j(B) are antitone, so the behavior of their
ratio is unpredictable.
3.3 The Family Example continued
We calculate the influence indices for the Family Example. Let us recall that
N = {1 = child, 2 = mother, 3 = father}.
In this example, there is no opposite influence of a coalition on a player, but there is a
direct influence on the child. We have for each S ⊆ N , j ∈ N \ S, dopα (B, S → j) = 0,
dα(B, 1→ 2) = dα(B, 1→ 3) = dα(B, 2→ 3) = dα(B, 3→ 2) = 0
dα(B, 12→ 3) = dα(B, 13→ 2) = 0, dα(B, 23→ 1) = 1
d(B, 2→ 1) = d(B, 3→ 1) = 1
2
d(B, 2→ 1) = d(B, 3→ 1) = 0
d∗(B, 2→ 1) = d∗(B, 3→ 1) = 1
4
Note that the weighted direct influence index of a coalition of the parents on the child
is equal to 1, while the weighted influence indices of the remaining two-player coalitions
are equal to 0.
4 The followers and purely influential functions
Before we focus on the influence functions B ∈ B, let us remark properties of some related
concepts. One of them is the concept of a follower of a given coalition, that is, a voter who
always follows the inclination of the coalition in question. We also introduce the concept
of an anti-follower of a coalition, that is, a voter whose decisions are always different from
the inclination of that coalition.
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Definition 6 Let ∅ 6= S ⊆ N and B ∈ B. The set of followers of S under B is defined
as
FB(S) := {j ∈ N | ∀i ∈ IS [(Bi)j = iS]}.
The set of anti-followers of S under B is defined as
FB(S) := {j ∈ N | ∀i ∈ IS [(Bi)j = −iS]}.
Letting FB(∅) := ∅, FB is a mapping from 2N to 2N .
We remark that FB(S) ⊇ S does not hold in general.
Proposition 2 Let B ∈ B. Then the following holds:
(i) Whenever S ∩ T = ∅, FB(S) ∩ FB(T ) = ∅.
(ii) FB is an isotone function (S ⊆ S ′ implies FB(S) ⊆ FB(S ′)).
Consequently, if FB(N) = ∅, then FB ≡ ∅.
(iii) For each j ∈ FB(S) \ S, dα(B, S → j) = 1, dopα (B, S → j) = 0.
Proof: (i) Since S ∩ T = ∅, IS ∩ IT strictly includes IS∪T , and there exists i ∈ IS ∩ IT
such that iS = −iT . Hence, if j ∈ FB(S) ∩ FB(T ), the equality (Bi)j = iS = iT cannot
hold for this i.
(ii) Take S ⊆ S ′ and j ∈ FB(S). i ∈ IS′ implies i ∈ IS by antitonicity, hence (Bi)j = iS
by hypothesis, and since iS = iS′ , j ∈ FB(S ′).
(iii) Let B ∈ B, S ⊂ N , FB(S) 6= ∅, and j ∈ FB(S)\S. Hence, for each i ∈ IS, (Bi)j = iS,
and therefore I∗S→j(B) = IS→j, I
∗op
S→j(B) = ∅, which means that dα(B, S → j) = 1, and
dopα (B, S → j) = 0. 
Note that the weighted direct influence index of a coalition on its follower outside the
coalition is equal to 1, while the weighted opposite influence index is equal to 0. Also
remark that (i) and (ii) hold for FB as well, and for (iii), the dual statement holds.
Assume FB is not identically the empty set. Then the kernel of B is the following
collection of sets:
K(B) := {S ∈ 2N | FB(S) 6= ∅, and S ′ ⊂ S ⇒ FB(S ′) = ∅}.
The kernel is well defined due to isotonicity of FB. It is the set of “true” influential
coalitions.
Definition 7 Let S, T be two disjoint non empty subsets of N . Function B is said to be
a purely influential function of S upon T if it satisfies for all i ∈ IS:
(Bi)j =
{
iS, if j ∈ T
ij, otherwise.
(4)
The set of such functions is denoted by BS→T .
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If all members of S have the same inclination, then each player from T follows S, and
each agent outside T decides according to his own inclination. Note that these functions
are arbitrary on I \ IS. It is easy to see that the cardinality of BS→T is
|BS→T | = 2n(2s−2)2n−s .
In each BS→T , there are 3 particular members. The minimal one is such that Bi = −1N
for all i ∈ I \ IS, the maximal one is such that Bi = 1N for all i ∈ I \ IS. More interesting
is the one which is the identity function on I \IS. We call it the canonical pure influential
function of S upon T , and we denote it by BS→T .
Proposition 3 presents some properties of the purely influential function of S on T .
First of all, all members of S ∪ T , and only them, are the followers of S. Moreover, the
weighted influence index of S on a player outside S under the purely influential function
is either equal to 1, if the player is a member of T , or equal to 0, if the player does not
belong to S ∪ T . Formally, we can write as follows:
Proposition 3 Let S, T be two disjoint non empty subsets of N . Then the following
holds:
(i) For all B ∈ BS→T , FB(S) = S ∪ T , FB(S) = ∅.
(ii) For each B ∈ BS→T and j ∈ N \ S, dopα (B, S → j) = 0, and
dα(B, S → j) =
{
1, if j ∈ T
0, if j ∈ N \ (S ∪ T ).
Proof: (i) Take t ∈ S ∪ T . If t ∈ T , then for any i ∈ IS, (Bi)t = iS. If t ∈ S, then for
any i ∈ IS, (Bi)t = it = iS. Hence t ∈ FB(S). On the other hand, take t ∈ FB(S). Then
for any i ∈ IS, (Bi)t = iS, and hence t ∈ S ∪T . Now suppose j ∈ FB(S). Hence, for each
i ∈ IS, (Bi)j = −iS, and therefore j /∈ S ∪ T since B ∈ BS→T . Let us assume j 6∈ S ∪ T .
If we take i ∈ IS such that ij = iS, we get (Bi)j = ij = iS, a contradiction.
(ii) Let B ∈ BS→T . Then for each i ∈ IS, (Bi)j = iS for j ∈ T , and (Bi)j = ij for j /∈ T .
Since IopS→j ⊂ IS, we have for each i ∈ IopS→j, (Bi)j = iS. Hence, I∗opS→j(B) = ∅ which gives
dopα (B, S → j) = 0. Moreover, since IS→j ⊂ IS, we have for each i ∈ IS→j, (Bi)j = iS for
j ∈ T , and (Bi)j = ij for j /∈ T . Hence, I∗S→j(B) = IS→j for j ∈ T , and I∗S→j(B) = ∅ for
j ∈ N \ (S ∪ T ), and therefore if j ∈ T , then dα(B, S → j) = 1, and if j ∈ N \ (S ∪ T ),
then dα(B, S → j) = 0. 
Example 2 The sets of followers and anti-followers of each coalition for the Family
Example are the following:
FB(∅) = FB(1) = ∅, FB(2) = {2}, FB(3) = {3}
FB(12) = {1, 2}, FB(13) = {1, 3}, FB(23) = {1, 2, 3}
FB(S) = ∅ for S ⊆ N.
The kernel of B is K(B) = {{2}, {3}}.
Moreover, our influence function happens to be the canonical pure influential function of
the parents upon the child, that is, B = B23→1. Hence, all players are the followers of the
coalition formed by the parents.
11
5 The influence functions
We turn to influence functions and first make a remark on their structure. B is the set of
mappings from the Boolean lattice (2N ,⊆) to (2N ,⊆), and so is itself a Boolean lattice.
We denote by ≤ the order relation, defined as B ≤ B′ iff Bi ≤ B′i for all i ∈ I. Hence B
is atomic, and its atoms are influence functions of the form
Bi :=
{
(−1N\j, 1j) if i = i0
−1N if i 6= i0
for some i0 ∈ I and j ∈ N . Thus, the number of atoms is n2n. Supremum and infimum
are defined by B ∨B′ = B ∪B′ and B ∧B′ = B ∩B′.
Next, we define several influence functions B ∈ B and investigate their properties,
using the tools described in Sections 3 and 4. In particular, for each influence function
analyzed, we determine the set of followers and the value of the weighted direct influence
index. We do not write down either the sets of the anti-followers or the weighted opposite
influence indices anymore, because results are symmetric to the ones concerning the sets
of followers and the weighted direct influence indices, and they can be easily determined
in an analogous way.
Some simple examples of influence functions are:
(i) The Majority function. Let n ≥ t > bn
2
c, and introduce for any i ∈ I the set
i+ := {k ∈ N | ik = +1}.
The majority influence function Maj[t] ∈ B is defined by
Maj[t]i :=
{
1N , if |i+| ≥ t
−1N , if |i+| < t
, ∀i ∈ I.
If a majority of players has an inclination +1, then all players decide +1. If not, all
players decide −1.
(ii) The Guru function. Let k˜ ∈ N be a particular player called the guru. The guru
influence function Gur[k˜] ∈ B is defined by
(Gur[k˜]i)j = ik˜, ∀i ∈ I, ∀j ∈ N. (5)
When a guru exists, every player follows the guru, whatever his inclination.
(iii) The identity function Id ∈ B is defined by
Idi = i, ∀i ∈ I.
The identity function depicts the absence of any influence.
(iv) The reversal function −Id ∈ B is simply the opposite of the identity function, hence
its notation. It depicts a systematic reversal of inclination, but does not show a clear
phenomenon of influence.
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(v) The mass psychology effect. Let t ∈ (0, n] and  ∈ {−1,+1}. Define for any i ∈ I
the set i := {k ∈ N | ik = } (remark that i+ = i+1). Functions B ∈ B satisfying for
each i ∈ I
if |i| ≥ t, then (Bi) ⊇ i (6)
are called mass psychology influence functions. If there is a sufficiently high number of
players with inclination , it will influence players with a − inclination, and some of
them will decide +, while the others will not change. Evidently, the majority function
Maj[t] is of this type with  = +1.
We denote by B[,t] the set of such influence functions. For  = −1, there is an interest-
ing interpretation for functions in B[−1,t]: such functions depict what could be called
the empty restaurant effect, since it is well known that people are reluctant to enter a
restaurant with very few people inside.
(vi) Let t ∈ (0, n]. Influence functions in B[+1,t] ∩ B[−1,n−t+1] are such that for each i ∈ I
i ≤ Bi⇔ |i+| ≥ t, and i ≥ Bi⇔ |i+| < t. (7)
These functions also depict a mass psychology effect, but in addition they specify
what happens if there is not enough people with inclination +1: some people with
inclination +1 decide for −1, and the others do not change.
In (3) we have already introduced the notations I+S→j and I
−
S→j for any ∅ 6= S ⊆ N
and j ∈ N \ S. More conveniently we introduce IS→j := {i ∈ IS→j | iS = }, with
 ∈ {−1,+1}, and additionally,
I+S→j,>t := {i ∈ I+S→j | |i+| > t} for t < n− 1
I+S→j,≥t := {i ∈ I+S→j | |i+| ≥ t} for t < n
I−S→j,<t := {i ∈ I−S→j | |i+| < t} for t > 1
Similarly, we can replace +,− by . We list some basic properties of the above mentioned
influence functions.
Proposition 4 Let n ≥ t > bn
2
c and consider the majority function Maj[t]. Then the
following holds:
(i) For each ∅ 6= S ⊆ N and j ∈ N \ S
dα(Maj
[t], S → j) =

1, if s ≥ t∑
i∈I+
S→j,≥t
αS→ji +
∑
i∈I−
S→j,<t
αS→ji∑
i∈IS→j α
S→j
i
, if s < t.
If t = n, we get dα(Maj
[t], S → j) = 1
2
.
(ii) For each S ⊆ N ,
FMaj[t](S) =
{
N, if s ≥ t
∅, if s < t. (8)
(iii) The kernel is K(Maj[t]) = {S ⊆ N | |S| = t}.
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Proof: (i) Let ∅ 6= S ⊆ N be such that s ≥ t, and j ∈ N \ S. If iS = +1, then
|i+| ≥ t and hence in particular (Maj[t]i)j = +1 = iS. If iS = −1, then |i+| < t and hence
in particular (Maj[t]i)j = −1 = iS. This means that I∗S→j(Maj[t]) = IS→j, and therefore
dα(Maj
[t], S → j) = 1.
Let ∅ 6= S ⊆ N be such that s < t, and j ∈ N \ S. Hence, we get
dα(Maj
[t], S → j) =
∑
i∈I∗S→j(Maj[t]) α
S→j
i∑
i∈IS→j α
S→j
i
=
∑
i∈I+S→j,≥t α
S→j
i +
∑
i∈I−S→j,<t α
S→j
i∑
i∈IS→j α
S→j
i
.
Let ∅ 6= S ⊆ N be such that s < t, t = n, and j ∈ N \S. Hence, for each i ∈ I \{1N},
Maj[t]i = −1N , and therefore I∗S→j(Maj[t]) = I−S→j. We have
dα(Maj
[t], S → j) =
∑
i∈I−S→j α
S→j
i∑
i∈IS→j α
S→j
i
=
1
2
∑
i∈IS→j α
S→j
i∑
i∈IS→j α
S→j
i
=
1
2
.
(ii) Let S ⊆ N be such that s ≥ t. Suppose that FMaj[t](S) 6= N . Then there exists
j ∈ N such that j /∈ FMaj[t](S). Hence, there is i˜ ∈ IS such that (Maj[t]˜i)j = −i˜S. Suppose
i˜S = +1. Hence, |i+| ≥ t, and therefore for each k ∈ N , (Maj[t]˜i)k = +1 = i˜S. Suppose
then that i˜S = −1. Hence, |i+| < t, and therefore for each k ∈ N , (Maj[t]˜i)k = −1 = i˜S, a
contradiction again.
Let S ⊆ N be such that s < t. Suppose that FMaj[t](S) 6= ∅, and let j˜ ∈ FMaj[t](S).
Hence, for each i ∈ IS, (Maj[t]i)j˜ = iS. Take i˜ ∈ IS such that i˜S = −i˜k for each k /∈ S.
If i˜S = +1, then |˜i+| < t, and hence for each j ∈ N , (Maj[t]˜i)j = −1 = −i˜S. If i˜S = −1,
then |˜i+| ≥ t, and hence for each j ∈ N , (Maj[t]˜i)j = +1 = −i˜S, a contradiction.
(iii) By virtue of (8), we have the following. If |S| < t, then FMaj[t](S) = ∅, and hence
S /∈ K(Maj[t]). If |S| = t, then FMaj[t](S) = N , but for each S ′ ⊂ S, |S ′| < t, and therefore
FMaj[t](S
′) = ∅. Hence, S ∈ K(Maj[t]). If |S| > t, then FMaj[t](S) = N , and there exists
S ′ ⊂ S such that |S ′| ≥ t, which means that FMaj[t](S ′) = N . Hence, S /∈ K(Maj[t]). 
Note that if the cardinality of a coalition is not smaller than the given threshold t,
then under the majority function the weighted direct influence index of that coalition
on every player outside the coalition is equal to 1, and all players always follow such a
coalition. If the cardinality of a coalition is smaller than t, then nobody is a follower of
that coalition. The kernel of the majority function consists of all the coalitions formed
by exactly t players.
Proposition 5 Let k˜ ∈ N and consider the guru influence function Gur[k˜]. Then the
following holds:
(i) For each ∅ 6= S ⊆ N and j ∈ N \ (S ∪ {k˜})
dα(Gur
[k˜], S → j) =

1, if k˜ ∈ S∑
i∈IS→j:iS=ik˜
αS→ji∑
i∈IS→j α
S→j
i
, if k˜ /∈ S.
In particular, d(Gur[k˜], S → j) = 1
2
if k˜ /∈ S.
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(ii) For each S ⊆ N ,
F
Gur[k˜]
(S) =
{
N, if k˜ ∈ S
∅, if k˜ /∈ S. (9)
(iii) The kernel is K(Gur[k˜]) = {k˜}.
(iv) Gur[k˜] is the unique purely influential function of k˜ upon N \k˜, i.e., Bk˜→N\k˜ = {Gur[k˜]}.
Proof: (iv) Gur[k˜] ∈ Bk˜→N\k˜ comes immediately from (4) and (5). Now, Bk˜→N\k˜ is
reduced to a singleton since I \ Ik˜ = ∅.
(i) Let ∅ 6= S ⊆ N be such that k˜ ∈ S, and j ∈ N \S. Hence, for each i ∈ I, (Gur[k˜]i)j = ik˜.
This means in particular that I∗S→j(Gur
[k˜]) = IS→j, and hence dα(Gur
[k˜], S → j) = 1.
Let ∅ 6= S ⊆ N be such that k˜ /∈ S, and j ∈ N \ (S ∪{k˜}). Hence, if i ∈ IS→j is such that
iS = ik˜, then i ∈ I∗S→j(Gur[k˜]), and if i ∈ IS→j is such that iS = −ik˜, then i /∈ I∗S→j(Gur[k˜]).
Hence, d(Gur[k˜], S → j) = 1
2
.
(ii) The first line can be deduced from the fact that F
[k˜]
Gur is an isotone function and from
Prop. 3 (i) since Gur[k˜] is purely influential by (iv).
Let S ⊆ N be such that k˜ /∈ S. Suppose that F
Gur[k˜]
(S) 6= ∅. Let j˜ ∈ F
Gur[k˜]
(S). Hence,
for each i ∈ IS, (Gur[k˜]i)j˜ = iS. Take i˜ ∈ IS such that i˜S = −i˜k. Hence, for each j ∈ N ,
(Gur[k˜]˜i)j = i˜k˜ = −i˜S, and in particular, (Gur[k˜]˜i)j˜ = i˜k˜ = −i˜S, a contradiction.
(iii) clear from (9). 
By virtue of Proposition 5, if the guru belongs to a coalition, then under the guru
influence function the weighted direct influence index of that coalition on every player
outside the coalition (and not the guru) is equal to 1. Moreover, everybody always follows
a coalition with the guru, and nobody is a follower of a coalition without a guru. Only
the one-player coalition formed by the guru belongs to the kernel of the guru influence
function.
Proposition 6 Let us consider the identity function Id. Then the following holds:
(i) For each ∅ 6= S ⊆ N and j ∈ N \ S, dα(Id, S → j) = 0.
(ii) For each S ⊆ N , FId(S) = S.
(iii) The kernel is K(Id) = {{k}, k ∈ N}.
Proof: (i) For each ∅ 6= S ⊆ N and j ∈ N \S, I∗S→j(Id) = ∅, and hence dα(Id, S → j) = 0.
(ii) Note that S ⊆ FId(S), because if j ∈ S, then in particular for each i ∈ IS, (Idi)j =
ij = iS. Suppose FId(S) 6⊆ S. Hence, there is k /∈ S such that k ∈ FId(S), and therefore for
each i ∈ IS, (Idi)k = iS. Take i˜ ∈ IS such that i˜S = −i˜k. Then we have (Id˜i)k = i˜S = −i˜k,
but Id˜i = i˜, a contradiction.
(iii) Clear from (ii). 
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Note that under the identity function, the weighted direct influence index of an arbi-
trary coalition on every player outside the coalition is equal to 0. For each coalition, all
members of the coalition and only them are the followers of that coalition. The kernel of
the identity function consists of all one-player coalitions.
Proposition 7 Let us consider the reversal function −Id. Then the following holds:
(i) For each ∅ 6= S ⊆ N and j ∈ N \ S, dα(−Id, S → j) = 1.
(ii) For each S ⊆ N , F−Id(S) = ∅.
(iii) The kernel is K(−Id) = ∅.
Proof: (i) Take arbitrary ∅ 6= S ⊆ N and j ∈ N \ S. Then I∗S→j(−Id) = IS→j, and
therefore dα(−Id, S → j) = 1.
(ii) Suppose there exists S ⊆ N such that F−Id(S) 6= ∅, that is, there is j ∈ F−Id(S). Then,
for each i ∈ IS, (−Idi)j = iS. Take i˜ ∈ IS such that i˜S = i˜j. Hence, (−Id˜i)j = i˜S = i˜j, but
−Id˜i = −i˜, a contradiction.
(iii) It comes immediately from (ii). 
Under the reversal function, the weighted direct influence index of an arbitrary coali-
tion on every player outside the coalition is equal to 1. Moreover, the kernel of the reversal
function and the sets of followers for every coalition are empty.
Proposition 8 Let t ∈ (0, n] and  ∈ {−1,+1} be fixed, and consider any influence
function B in B[,t]. Then the following holds:
(i) There exists B ∈ B[,t] such that for each ∅ 6= S ⊆ N and j ∈ N \ S,
dα(B, S → j) = 0.
(ii) If t = 1, then for each ∅ 6= S ⊆ N , j ∈ N \ S,
dα(B, S → j) ≤ 1
2
.
Moreover, the upper bound 1
2
is attained for at least one function B in B[,t].
(iii) For each ∅ 6= S ⊆ N such that s > n− t, t > 1, and j ∈ N \ S, there exists B ∈ B[,t]
such that
dα(B, S → j) = 1.
(iv) For each ∅ 6= S ⊆ N such that s ≤ n− t, t > 1, j ∈ N \ S,
dα(B, S → j) ≤
∑
i∈IS→j α
S→j
i +
∑
i∈I−S→j,<t α
S→j
i∑
i∈IS→j α
S→j
i
.
In particular,
d(B, S → j) ≤ 1
2
+
1
2n−s
t−2∑
p=0
(
n− s− 1
p
)
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d(B, S → j) ∈ {0, 1
2
}.
Moreover, for each ∅ 6= S ⊆ N such that s ≤ n− t and j ∈ N \ S, there is B ∈ B[,t]
such that
dα(B, S → j) =
∑
i∈IS→j α
S→j
i +
∑
i∈I−S→j,<t α
S→j
i∑
i∈IS→j α
S→j
i
.
(v) For each S ⊆ N ,
FB(S) ⊆ S if s ≤ n− t.
Moreover, there exists B ∈ B[,t] such that for each S ⊆ N , FB(S) = S.
Proof: (i) Remark that Id ∈ B[,t] for any  ∈ {−1,+1} and any t ∈ (0, n]. By virtue of
Proposition 6, (i), we get dα(Id, S → j) = 0 for each ∅ 6= S ⊆ N and j ∈ N \ S.
(ii) Let t = 1. For each ∅ 6= S ⊆ N and j ∈ N \ S, we have, using (2)∑
i∈IS→j
αS→ji = 2
∑
i∈IS→j
αS→ji .
In addition, I∗S→j(B) ∩ I−S→j = ∅. Hence,
dα(B, S → j) =
∑
i∈I∗S→j(B) α
S→j
i∑
i∈IS→j α
S→j
i
≤
∑
i∈IS→j(B) α
S→j
i∑
i∈IS→j α
S→j
i
=
1
2
.
Remark that B defined by Bi = 1N for each i ∈ I belongs to B[,1]. Take arbitrary
∅ 6= S ⊆ N and j ∈ N \ S. Note that I∗S→j(B) = IS→j. Hence, for this B
dα(B, S → j) = 1
2
.
(iii) Take arbitrary ∅ 6= S ⊆ N such that s > n− t, t > 1, and j /∈ S. Define B as follows:
(Bi)k =
{
iS, if i ∈ IS→j and k = j
ik, otherwise
Note that B belongs to B[,t], because if i ∈ I−S→j, then |i| < t, and if i ∈ I \ I−S→j, then
(6) is satisfied. We have dα(B, S → j) = 1.
(iv) Let B ∈ B[,t]. Take arbitrary ∅ 6= S ⊆ N such that s ≤ n− t, t > 1, and j /∈ S. Note
that if i ∈ I−S→j is such that |i| ≥ t, then i /∈ I∗S→j(B). Hence,
dα(B, S → j) ≤
∑
i∈IS→j α
S→j
i +
∑
i∈I−S→j,<t α
S→j
i∑
i∈IS→j α
S→j
i
Moreover,
d(B, S → j) = |I
∗
S→j(B)|
2n−s
≤ |I

S→j|
2n−s
+
1
2n−s
t−2∑
p=0
(
n− s− 1
p
)
=
1
2
+
1
2n−s
t−2∑
p=0
(
n− s− 1
p
)
17
Moreover, d(B, S → j) 6= 1, because if i ∈ I−S→j is such that ik =  for each k /∈ S, then
i /∈ I∗S→j(B). Hence, d(B, S → j) ∈ {0, 12}.
Finally, define B as follows. For each k 6= j, (Bi)k = ik for i ∈ I, and
(Bi)j =

, if i ∈ IS→j
−, if i ∈ I−S→j and |i| < t
ij, otherwise
This B belongs to B[,t], and we get then
dα(B, S → j) =
∑
i∈IS→j α
S→j
i +
∑
i∈I−S→j,<t α
S→j
i∑
i∈IS→j α
S→j
i
.
(v) Let t ∈ (0, n] and s ≤ n − t. Suppose there is B ∈ B[,t] such that FB(S) 6⊆ S for
a certain S ⊆ N . This means that FB(S) 6= ∅, since ∅ ⊆ S for each S. Hence, there is
k /∈ S such that k ∈ FB(S). This means that for each i ∈ IS, (Bi)k = iS. Take i˜ ∈ IS
such that i˜S = −, i˜k = , and |˜i| ≥ t. Such an i˜ always exists, because n − s ≥ t. We
have (Bi˜)k = i˜S = −, and therefore (˜i) 6⊆ (Bi˜). But since |˜i| ≥ t, we should have
(˜i) ⊆ (Bi˜), a contradiction.
If we take B = Id, then for each S ⊆ N , FId(S) = S. 
Proposition 9 Let B ∈ B[+1,t]∩B[−1,n−t+1], i.e., satisfying (7). Then the following holds:
(i) For each t ∈ (0, n] there exists B ∈ B[+1,t] ∩ B[−1,n−t+1] such that for each ∅ 6= S ⊆ N
and j ∈ N \ S,
d(B, S → j) = 0.
(ii) If t ∈ {1, n}, then for each ∅ 6= S ⊆ N , j ∈ N \ S,
dα(B, S → j) ≤ 1
2
.
Moreover, there exists B ∈ B[+1,t] ∩ B[−1,n−t+1] such that for each ∅ 6= S ⊆ N and
j ∈ N \ S,
dα(B, S → j) = 1
2
.
(iii) For each ∅ 6= S ⊆ N such that s ≥ t > n− s, 1 < t < n, and j ∈ N \ S, there exists
B ∈ B[+1,t] ∩ B[−1,n−t+1] such that
dα(B, S → j) = 1.
(iv) For each ∅ 6= S ⊆ N such that s ≤ n− t, 1 < t ≤ n, j ∈ N \ S,
dα(B, S → j) ≤
∑
i∈I+S→j α
S→j
i +
∑
i∈I−S→j,<t α
S→j
i∑
i∈IS→j α
S→j
i
,
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the upper bound being attained for at least one B in B[+1,t]∩B[−1,n−t+1]. In particular,
d(B, S → j) ≤ 1
2
+
1
2n−s
t−2∑
p=0
(
n− s− 1
p
)
d(B, S → j) ∈ {0, 1
2
}.
(v) For each ∅ 6= S ⊆ N such that s < t, t < n, and j ∈ N \ S
dα(B, S → j) ≤
∑
i∈I−S→j α
S→j
i +
∑
i∈I+S→j,≥t α
S→j
i∑
i∈IS→j α
S→j
i
,
the upper bound being attained for at least one B in B[+1,t]∩B[−1,n−t+1]. In particular,
d(B, S → j) ≤ 1
2
+
1
2n−s
n−s−1∑
p=t−s
(
n− s− 1
p
)
d(B, S → j) ∈ {0, 1
2
}.
(vi) For each ∅ 6= S ⊆ N such that s < t ≤ n− s, 1 < t < n, j ∈ N \ S,
dα(B, S → j) ≤
∑
i∈I+S→j,≥t α
S→j
i +
∑
i∈I−S→j,<t α
S→j
i∑
i∈IS→j α
S→j
i
,
the upper bound being attained for at least one B in B[+1,t]∩B[−1,n−t+1]. In particular,
d(B, S → j) ≤ 1
2n−s
n−s−1∑
p=t−s
(
n− s− 1
p
)
+
1
2n−s
t−2∑
p=0
(
n− s− 1
p
)
d(B, S → j) = 0.
(vii) For each S ⊆ N ,
FB(S) ⊆ S if s ≤ n− t or s < t
FB(S) ⊇ S if n− s < t ≤ s.
Moreover, there is B ∈ B such that for each S ⊆ N , FB(S) = S.
Proof: (i), (ii) and (iii): just apply Proposition 8 for B[+1,t] and B[−1,n−t+1].
(iv) and (v) correspond to (iv) in Proposition 8 for  = +1,−1 respectively. Then (vi) is
intersection of both.
(vii) The first line comes from Proposition 8 (v).
Let s ≥ t > n − s. Suppose there is B ∈ B[+1,t] ∩ B[−1,n−t+1] such that S 6⊆ FB(S) for a
certain S ⊆ N . This means that there exists k ∈ S such that k /∈ FB(S), and therefore
there is i˜ ∈ IS such that (Bi˜)k = −i˜S. If i˜S = +1, then (Bi˜)k = −1, and hence i˜ 6≤ Bi˜.
But since s ≥ t, we have |i+| ≥ t, and therefore i˜ ≤ Bi˜. Hence, i˜S = −1, and (Bi˜)k = +1.
But this means that i˜ 6≥ Bi˜. Since t > n − s, we have |i+| < t, and therefore i˜ ≥ Bi˜, a
contradiction.
If we take B = Id, then for each S ⊆ N , FB(S) = S.

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6 The modified decisional power
After studying the influence, we consider the second part of our description, namely the
group decision part. We analyze the concepts of Success, Decisiveness, Luck, and Failure
of a player, which are defined as a probability that the player is successful, is decisive, is
lucky, and fails, respectively. In Rusinowska and De Swart (2006), when the two functions
B and gd were not separated, the notions of Success, Luck, Failure, and Decisiveness of
a player were defined starting not from the final decision of the player in question, but
from his inclination (for an analysis of success and decisiveness of a player in voting
situations, see for instance Laruelle and Valenciano (2005)). Consequently, based on the
definition given in Rusinowska and De Swart (2006), we say that a player is successful if his
inclination coincides with the group decision. When we adopt such a definition of being
successful, if all inclination vectors are equally probable, then the generalized Hoede-
Bakker index is a kind of a ‘net’ Success (Rusinowska, 2008), i.e., it is equal to ‘Success
− Failure = Decisiveness’. Moreover, under such a definition of Success, if all inclination
vectors are equally probable, then the generalized Hoede-Bakker index coincides with the
absolute Banzhaf index; see Rusinowska and De Swart (2006).
If we separate the two functions B and gd, we can define Success, Failure, Luck, and
Decisiveness of a player starting from the final decision of the player, not as before from
the inclination. For instance, under such a definition, a player is said to be successful if his
decision coincides with the group decision. This is equivalent to the definition of success
in a voting situation, presented in Laruelle and Valenciano (2005), where a player is said
to be successful if his vote coincides with the result (i.e., if either the player votes YES
and the proposal is accepted, or he votes NO and the proposal is rejected).
In our framework of players’ decisions and the group decision, we can formalize the
concepts of success and decisiveness as follows. Given a probability distribution p : I →
[0, 1] over all inclination vectors, and B ∈ B, we define pB = P ◦ B−1 on I (probability
of the decision vectors), where P is the probability measure induced by p. We define now
the group decision function gd : I → {+1,−1} on the set of all n-vectors, assigning (as
before) the value +1 if the group decision is YES, and −1 if the group decision is NO.
Moreover, for b ∈ I and k ∈ N , we define b−k ∈ I by
b−kj =
{
bj if j 6= k
−bj if j = k .
Definition 8 Given gd ∈ G, pB : I → [0, 1], we define for each k ∈ N
– Player k’s Success
SUCk(gd, pB) := Pr(k is successful) =
∑
{b∈I|bk=gd(b)}
pB(b) (10)
– Player k’s Failure
FAILk(gd, pB) := Pr(k fails) =
∑
{b∈I|bk=−gd(b)}
pB(b) (11)
– Player k’s Decisiveness
DECk(gd, pB) := Pr(k is decisive) =
∑
{b∈I|bk=gd(b)=−gd(b−k)}
pB(b)
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– Player k’s Luck
LUCKk(gd, pB) := Pr(k is lucky) =
∑
{b∈I|bk=gd(b)=gd(b−k)}
pB(b)
According to Barry (1980), the following relation between Success, Luck, and Decisiveness
holds:
Success = Decisiveness + Luck
and in our case, we have for each k ∈ N , pB, and gd ∈ G
SUCk(gd, pB) = DECk(gd, pB) + LUCKk(gd, pB)
SUCk(gd, pB) = 1− FAILk(gd, pB).
Based on the above, we modify the generalized Hoede-Bakker index in two respects.
Fist of all, the inclination vectors do not need to be equally probable, as it was assumed
in the original framework. Moreover, we do not consider the inclination vectors with
the positive (or negative) inclination of the given player, but we consider the inclination
vectors that lead to the positive (or negative) decision of the player in question. We
propose therefore the following modification of the decisional power:
Definition 9 Given B ∈ B, gd ∈ G, p : I → [0, 1], we define for each k ∈ N the modified
decisional power by
φk(B, gd, p) :=
∑
{i|(Bi)k=+1}
p(i)gd(Bi)−
∑
{i|(Bi)k=−1}
p(i)gd(Bi). (12)
The modified decisional power is also a kind of the net success, that is, we have the
following:
Proposition 10 Given B ∈ B, gd ∈ G, and p : I → [0, 1], for each k ∈ N
φk(B, gd, p) = SUCk(gd, pB)− FAILk(gd, pB).
Proof: Let B ∈ B, gd ∈ G, p : I → [0, 1], and k ∈ N . From (12), we have
φk(B, gd, p) =
∑
{i|(Bi)k=+1}
p(i)gd(Bi)−
∑
{i|(Bi)k=−1}
p(i)gd(Bi)
=
∑
{i|(Bi)k=gd(Bi)}
p(i)−
∑
{i|(Bi)k=−gd(Bi)}
p(i)
By virtue of (10) and (11),
SUCk(gd, pB)− FAILk(gd, pB) =
∑
{b∈I|bk=gd(b)}
pB(b)−
∑
{b∈I|bk=−gd(b)}
pB(b)
=
∑
{b∈B(I)|bk=gd(b)}
∑
{i|Bi=b}
p(i)−
∑
{b∈B(I)|bk=−gd(b)}
∑
{i|Bi=b}
p(i)
=
∑
{i|(Bi)k=gd(Bi)}
p(i)−
∑
{i|(Bi)k=−gd(Bi)}
p(i) = φk(B, gd, p)
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Let us notice that while φ is equal to ‘Success − Failure’ under the new definition of
being successful (based on decisions, not as before on inclinations), in general it is not
equal to ‘Decisiveness’ anymore.
Example 3 Let us come back to the Family Example. Since the weather happens to be
rather unstable, the actors are not that enthusiastic to decide for the trip. Moreover, a
new attractive computer game, a romance just bought and looking very interesting, and a
telecast of an important football match are of importance when making the decision. The
inclinations of the players to say YES are independent of each other and their probabilities
are equal to 1
2
, 1
3
, and 0, for the child, the mother and the father, respectively. The parents
try not to discriminate their child in family decision-making, and it is agreed that the
family decides for the trip if at least two family members say YES. Table 2 presents the
probability distribution over all inclination vectors, and the decision vectors, while Table
3 shows the probability distribution over all decision vectors, and the group decisions.
Table 2. The inclination and decision vectors
i ∈ I (1, 1, 1) (1, 1,−1) (1,−1, 1) (−1, 1, 1) (1,−1,−1) (−1, 1,−1) (−1,−1, 1) (−1,−1,−1)
p(i) 0 1
6
0 0 1
3
1
6
0 1
3
B(i) (1, 1, 1) (1, 1,−1) (1,−1, 1) (1, 1, 1) (−1,−1,−1) (−1, 1,−1) (−1,−1, 1) (−1,−1,−1)
Table 3. The group decision
b ∈ B(I) (1, 1, 1) (1, 1,−1) (1,−1, 1) (−1, 1,−1) (−1,−1, 1) (−1,−1,−1)
pB(b) 0
1
6
0 1
6
0 2
3
gd(b) +1 +1 +1 −1 −1 −1
Moreover, gd(−1, 1, 1) = +1, and gd(1,−1,−1) = −1.
Based on the given information, we get the following:
SUC1(gd, pB) = 1, SUC2(gd, pB) = SUC3(gd, pB) =
5
6
FAIL1(gd, pB) = 0, FAIL2(gd, pB) = FAIL3(gd, pB) =
1
6
DEC1(gd, pB) =
1
3
, DEC2(gd, pB) = DEC3(gd, pB) =
1
6
LUCK1(gd, pB) = LUCK2(gd, pB) = LUCK3(gd, pB) =
2
3
φ1(B, gd, p) = 1, φ2(B, gd, p) = φ3(B, gd, p) =
2
3
.
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7 Conclusions
The improvement brought in this paper emphasizes the role of the influence function in
the Hoede-Bakker index. In order to analyze the influence in this framework, the two
parts, i.e., the influence part and the group decision part, are separated. The description
proposed here fully takes into account the mutual influence among players. In particu-
lar, we define the possibility influence index which takes into account any possibility of
influence, and the certainty influence index which expresses certainty of influence. These
indices are special cases of the weighted influence index, where some weights of influence
of a coalition are introduced. These weights depend on the number of players that have
the same inclination as the coalition in question. We also distinguish between the direct
influence and the opposite influence. Both concepts express the ability of a coalition to
make a player vote differently from his inclination. When influencing directly, the incli-
nations of the player and the coalition are different from each other, and the decision of
the player coincides with the inclination of the coalition. When calculating the opposite
influence, we consider the inclination vectors such that the inclinations of the player and
the coalition coincide, but the decision of the player is different from the inclination of
the coalition.
Why do not we introduce just one influence index? The answer is simple. We cannot
do it, because the process of influence is very complex and one may imagine many possible
kinds of influence. In order to capture (most or all of) them, we define the general tool,
the weighted (direct or opposite) influence index which, depending on the assumptions
and weights, can measure the different kinds of influence. To the best of our knowledge,
such influence indices have not been proposed before, and seem to be a very useful tool,
in particular, in the theory of coalition and alliance formation, negotiations, and more
generally multi-agent systems.
Apart from the influence indices, we investigate other tools to analyze the influence
and the influence functions, like the set of followers of a coalition, the concept of the
purely influential function, and the kernel of an influence function. All these tools help
us to understand and characterize better the process of influence. In particular, we study
properties of several interesting ‘real-world’ influence functions.
To summarize, in the paper we first separate the two parts of the model. Since the
influence part of the framework has not been studied before in the literature, we focus on
this first part of the model. We try to analyze what happens in the process of influence, i.e.,
we look at the link between an (original) inclination of a player and his (final) decision. In
particular, we investigate the influence functions and we propose the indices to measure
the influence. This is presented in Sections 3, 4, and 5, and constitutes the core of the
paper. Nevertheless, in order to obtain the whole picture of the model, we analyze also
the second part of the framework, i.e., the process from the decisions of the agents to the
group decision. This is presented in Section 6. Since the group decision part is related
to voting situations that have been considered before, we first link our framework to a
probabilistic model presented in the voting power literature. First of all, for the second
part of our model we define the concepts of success, failure, decisiveness, and luck. These
concepts link the (final) decisions of the agents to the group decision. Moreover, we
propose a modified decisional power, which allows the inclination vectors to be unequally
probable, and which is based on the decisions and the group decision. It is important to
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stress that we do not consider the new definition of success and decisiveness to be better
than the one given in Rusinowska and De Swart (2006), where the concepts of success
and decisiveness link the (original) inclinations of the agents to the group decision. These
approaches are simply different from each other. If, for example, we consider a successful
player as a player whose decision coincides with the group decision, then the approach
of the present paper should be applied. However, if a successful player is rather seen as
a player whose inclination coincides with the group decision, which seems to be quite
natural as well, then the ‘old’ approach should be used.
There are still several other improvements we would like to bring to this framework
in our future research. One of the new research lines may be to introduce dynamic as-
pects. The framework analyzed here is, in fact, a decision process after a single step of
mutual influence. In reality, the mutual influence does not stop necessarily after one step
but may iterate. We propose to study the behavior of the series Bi,B2i, ..., Bni; to find
convergence conditions, and to study the corresponding decisional power. An interesting
generalization would be also to assume that the influence function B is a probabilistic
function. Another improvement could be to enlarge the set of possible decisions to games
on product lattices (Grabisch and Lange, 2007). Moreover, we would like to provide an
axiomatic characterization of the influence indices. Finally, in order to get a deeper in-
sight into the process of influence between agents, some experiments on this issue could
be conducted.
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